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Abstract
We examine the role of leverage in tender oﬀers for widely held firms. Leverage allows
raiders to appropriate part of the value gains arising from takeovers, hence reducing the
takeover premium and mitigating the free-rider problem. Leveraged takeovers may thus be
profitable even if target shareholders are dispersed. Bankruptcy costs, incentive problems on
the part of the raider, and defensive leveraged recapitalizations and asset sales by the target
management all limit the raider’s ability to borrow, thus shifting takeover gains to target
shareholders and reducing the takeover likelihood. While bankruptcy costs are a social cost,
the takeover premium is merely a wealth transfer to target shareholders. As the raider does
not maximize social welfare, he uses too much debt compared to the social optimum.
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What this all comes down to is simply withdrawing the warm
blood of equity and replacing it with the cold water of debt.
Fred Hartley, CEO of Unocal.1
1 Introduction
The 1980s marked a dramatic change in corporate governance. Pygm-sized financial buyers like
Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, & Co and raiders like Carl Icahn, T. Boone Pickens, and Ronald
Perelman challenged the leadership of some of the nation’s largest companies. Connie Bruck,
in her acclaimed book The Predators’ Ball (1988, p.14), writes: “[N]o prey was too large and
no predator too inconsequential–so long as Milken could tap into his magic pools of capital.
Overnight, all the rules of survival in the corporate jungle had been rewritten.”
Ownership of target firms was often dispersed. To gain control of the target, the raider would
then typically make a tender oﬀer. One of the characteristic features of the 1980s takeover wave
is that tender oﬀers were highly leveraged (Scherer (1988), Holmström and Kaplan (2001)). As
the raider had typically no, or only few, assets of his own, the assets of the target firm would
serve as security for his debt. This is known as bootstrap acquisition, as it enables “the buyer
to “bootstrap” the acquisition of a business and pay oﬀ the indebtness with money earned in
the acquired company’s operations” (Crawford (1987, p.1)). The vast majority of LBOs were
structured this way.
Compared to its empirical relevance, relatively little is known about the economic role of
leverage in tender oﬀers. Beginning with Grossman and Hart (1980), a large literature has
analyzed tender oﬀers in which target shareholders are non-pivotal, leading to the well-known
holdout (or free-rider) problem (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Stulz (1988), Grossman and
Hart (1988), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), Hirshleifer (1995), Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi
(1998)). All these papers assume that the raider finances his bid with cash out of his own
pocket. That is, the question of how the raider should optimally finance his bid, and how this
might aﬀect the tender oﬀer outcome, is not explored. On the other hand, a number of papers
examine the role of the means of payment in takeovers (e.g., Hansen (1987), Fishman (1989)).
The focus of these papers is diﬀerent from ours.2 In particular, none of these papers considers
1When faced with a hostile takeover bid by T. Boone Pickens (Wasserstein (1998, p.146)).
2 In Hansen (1987) and Fishman (1989) the means of payment (debt, equity, cash) serves as a signalling device.
Related is also Chowdhry and Nanda (1993), who examine the eﬀect of bidder leverage on bidding competition.
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the holdout problem that is characteristic of widely held firms. Instead, these papers assume
that target shareholders sell whenever they make a profit.
This paper studies the role of leverage, and, more generally, the role of financing choice, in
tender oﬀers for widely held firms. To isolate the eﬀects of financing choice from previously
studied eﬀects, we initially abstract from dilution, freezeouts, and toeholds. Our starting point
is the observation that leverage reduces the posttakeover share value, and thus the price at
which dispersed target shareholders are willing to tender their shares. This allows the raider to
extract part of the value gains arising from the takeover, thus making socially eﬃcient takeovers
profitable. One policy implication from this is that restricting the use of leverage in takeovers–
a common practice in many European countries–might hamper the eﬃcacy of the market for
corporate control. In terms of economic eﬀects, leverage works similar to dilution: It reduces the
posttakeover share value and hence the incentives of target shareholders to hold out. Unlike the
dilution mechanisms proposed by Grossman and Hart (1980), however, the transaction structure
underlying LBOs (“bootstrap mechanism”) is (i) common and (ii) consistent with both the law
and legal practice in the U.S.3 ,4
In a bootstrap acquisition, the raider borrows against the future assets of the combined firm.
The debt is issued by a special acquisition vehicle which–after the raider has gained control–is
merged into the target firm to provide debtholders with a legal recourse to the pledged assets.
Hence there are two steps: a tender oﬀer and a subsequent merger.5 What is important is
that the debt assumed by the raider enters into the combined firm’s capital structure, where it
lowers the firm’s equity value and thus the takeover premium.6 This eﬀect is consistent with
Like Hansen and Fishman, the authors do not consider the free-rider problem.
3LBOs were particularly common in the 1980s: In 1986, for instance, LBOs represented nearly 40 percent of
all public acquisitions. The use of LBOs finally came to a halt when the junk bond market collapsed: In 1991,
the total value of LBO and MBO transactions fell to $1 billion from $80 billion in 1988 (Jensen (1993)).
4Another potential benefit of LBOs is pointed out by Jensen (1986). While his argument that debt limits the
ability of managers to squander funds is compelling, the same result can be achieved by financing the takeover
with equity and leveraging the company after the takeover. By contrast, it is crucial for our argument that the
takeover itself is being leveraged.
5“The merger step is, of course, essential to permit the buyer to restructure the assets of the target company
and use them to repay acquisition debt” (Scharf, Shea, and Beck (1991, p.331)). Courts view the tender oﬀer cum
merger as one transaction (Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94, Bkptcy. Rptr. 488, 502 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
6This aspect of LBOs has hitherto received little attention. An exception is Scherer (1988, p.77ﬀ), who notes
that a “promiment characteristic of takeovers in the 1980s is the extensive use of debt financing, introducing
increased leverage into the merged company’s financial structure” (italics added).
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empirical evidence. Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) document a positive relation
between bidder returns and the bidder’s debt-equity ratio. Similarly, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling
(1991) find that target returns are negatively related to the bidder’s leverage.
The relation to previous literature is now evident. In the literature, the raider generates
a value improvement v, which may be best thought of as an improvement in the value of the
firm’s assets. The question is whether such value-increasing takeovers can materialize given that
target shareholders are dispersed. In pevious models, the bid price is financed with cash out of
the raider’s pocket. Absent any increase in debt, the posttakeover equity value then increases
by the same amount as the assets, v. To induce target shareholders to tender, the raider must
consequently oﬀer a takeover premium of v, which implies he makes no profit. With epsilon
transaction costs, the takeover fails (Grossman and Hart (1980)). Evidently, the outcome is
similar if the raider finances his bid by issuing equity: An increase in the value of the assets by
v translates again into an increase in the posttakeover equity value by the same amount.
Suppose now the raider finances his bid by issuing debt D ≤ v backed by the combined firm’s
assets. (On the assumption that D ≤ v, see below.) Unlike above, the combined firm’s equity
value only increases by v −D. While the raider still brings in a value improvement of v, part
of this value improvement, D, has now already been pledged to a third party (debtholders) ex
ante. The net increase in the combined firm’s equity value–and thus the takeover premium–is
therefore only v−D. Given that target shareholders no longer extract the full value improvement
v, but only a fraction, the takeover may be profitable. The crux is that the proceeds from the
debt issue are not added to the firm’s assets. They are used to pay for the tendered shares and
transaction costs.7
The type of transaction structure examined here–including the second-step merger–is both
common and legal.8 Legal foundations are discussed in the paper. Let us therefore be brief. The
right to eﬀect the merger is given by law. Depending on the circumstances, minority shareholders
have one of two remedies: They can seek judicial appraisal of their shares, or they can or sue
the raider for breach of fiduciary duty. De facto, neither is an issue here since along with his
debt, the raider also brings in the value improvement.
Let us provide a simple example. In the example, the proceeds from the debt issue are just
7By the same logic, if the raider has private wealth, he would optimally not want to bring it into the merged
company. This is why in practice the acquisition vehicle carrying the debt is set up as a limited liability company.
8For a recent example of a second-step merger in which minority shareholders received shares in the combined
firm, see In re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 19876 (2002).
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suﬃcient to pay for the tendered shares. In the paper, we show that if this is not the case,
the raider can additionally issue equity to cover the remainder. The qualitative results remain
the same. Similarly, our qualitative results hold if the proceeds from the debt issue exceed the
required funds. Moreover, both in the example and in the paper, the terms of the merger are the
same for debt and equity financing. Specifically, it is assumed that in both cases nontendering
shareholders retain their proportionate equity ownership. It is thus not the merger per se that
causes a diﬀerence between debt and equity, but the fact that debt and equity financing have
diﬀerent eﬀects on the postmerger capital structure. Finally, the example involves a cash oﬀer,
where the cash can be raised by issuing either equity or debt. In the paper, we show that the
same logic extends to exchange oﬀers, where debt and equity are the medium of exchange.
Example. The target is widely held, has outstanding debt D = 0, assets A =
50, and thus equity E = 50. The value improvement is v = 100. The oﬀer is for
cash, and the question is how the raider should raise the cash. If he issues equity,
the combined firm’s asset/capital structure is A = 150, D = 0, and E = 150. To
induce target shareholders to tender, the raider must then oﬀer b ≥ 150 (Grossman
and Hart (1980)). The situation is thus the same as in the case where the bid is
financed with cash out of the raider’s pocket: Target shareholders extract the full
value improvement. With epsilon transaction costs, the takeover fails.
Suppose now the raider issues debt D = 75. (This does not to mean that D = 75
is optimal.) The combined firm’s asset/capital structure is A = 150, D = 75, and
E = 75. Instead of the full v = 100, the posttakeover share value increases only
by v −D = 25. Accordingly, the raider must bid only b = 75, which implies target
shareholders extract only part of the surplus, namely 25. Consider finally the raider’s
profit. He raises D = 75 in the debt issue, pays b = 75 for the tendered shares, and
receives shares worth E = 75 in return. Hence the raider’s profit is 75, which implies
the takeover is profitable as long as transaction costs are below 75.9
More generally, any tender oﬀer can be viewed as a bargaining problem, where the raider and
target shareholders bargain over some value improvement. Let α and 1− α denote the raider’s
and target shareholders’ bargaining powers, respectively. In the Grossman-Hart (1980) setting
9We have assumed that if b = 75, all shareholders tender. Strictly speaking, any fraction of tendered shares
β ∈ [0.5, 1] is an equilibrium. Regardless of β, however, the raider’s profit is always 75 : He raises 75 in the debt
issue, pays 75β for the tendered shares, and receives shares worth 75β.
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with non-pivotal shareholders, the raider’s bargaining power is α = 0.10 Debt financing reduces
the “size of the pie” over which the parties bargain. Instead of the full v = 100, they bargain
over only 100−D = 25. The rest, 75, has already been pledged to debtholders. The crux is that
the raider can fully recoup D ex ante. His profit is therefore α(v −D) +D = 75, while target
shareholders receive (1− α) (v −D) = 25. The raider’s “eﬀective bargaining power” is thus not
α = 0, but α0 = α+ (1− α)D/v = 0.75.11
In our model, it is not optimal to set D > v, which would push the posttakeover share value
below the pretakeover value. With Pareto dominance as selection criterion, any bid below the
pretakeover share value fails. But if the raider must oﬀer at least the pretakeover share value,
there is no point in pushing the posttakeover share value below it. Typically, in our model the
posttakeover share value exceeds the pretakeover value. Reasons are bidding competition, costly
bankruptcy, and ex-post incentive problems on the part of the raider.
If bankruptcy is costly, the socially optimal debt level is that where the raider makes just
enough profit to carry out the takeover. Any increase in leverage beyond this point is so-
cially wasteful: It reduces the takeover premium–which is merely a wealth transfer to target
shareholders–but increases bankruptcy costs. Since the raider does not maximize social welfare,
he borrows too much. Our model suggests that in regimes with high bankruptcy costs fewer
takeovers succeed. Those that do succeed, however, command a higher takeover premium.
We next consider the interaction between toehold and leverage. A toehold reduces the
benefits of leverage, since the takeover premium must be paid on fewer shares. By contrast, the
costs of leverage (bankruptcy costs) are unaﬀected by the toehold. When trading oﬀ bankruptcy
costs against takeover premium, the raider issues less debt, which implies a higher takeover
premium. This is in contrast to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Hirshleifer and Titman (1990),
who both argue that toeholds lower the takeover premium.
We subsequently consider defensive leveraged recapitalizations and asset sales by the tar-
get management. Previous models of defensive capital structure changes all assume that the
takeover is financed with cash out of the raider’s pocket (e.g., Stulz (1988), Harris and Raviv
(1988), Israel (1991), Zwiebel (1996)). Consequently, none of these papers explores the link
10With finitely many shareholders, there is a positive probability that any single shareholder is pivotal, implying
that α ∈ (0, 1) (Bagnoli and Lipman (1988), Holmström and Nalebuﬀ (1992)). Our argument holds as long as
α < 1. Hence it also applies to pivotal-shareholder settings à la Bagnoli-Lipman and Holmström-Nalebuﬀ.
11This is related to the strategic use of debt in Perotti and Spier (1993). There, firms borrow against the future
surplus from investments in order to avoid having to share this surplus in the subsequent bargaining with unions.
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between target capital structure and bidder leverage. In our model, high target leverage impairs
the raider’s ability to borrow, thereby reducing the takeover likelihood.12 Asset sales (e.g., sales
of crown jewels) have a similar eﬀect.
We finally examine the eﬀect of leverage on the raider’s incentives to create value. If the
value improvement depends on the raider’s eﬀort, high leverage creates a debt overhang problem,
since part of the benefits goes to debtholders. As a consequence, the raider uses less debt ex
ante to improve his incentives ex post. This, in turn, raises the takeover premium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and illustrates the
main result. Section 3 examines the tradeoﬀ between bankruptcy costs and takeover premium.
Section 4 considers the interplay between toehold and leverage. Section 5 shows how leveraged
recapitalizations and asset sales impair the raider’s ability to borrow. Section 6 examines the
eﬀect of leverage on the raider’s incentives to create value. Section 7 discusses legal foundations.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
The setting is similar to Grossman and Hart (1980), Hirshleifer (1995), and others, except that
it incorporates the raider’s financing choice. We consider a widely held firm (the “target”)
facing a potential acquirer (the “raider”). The target has no outstanding debt, and the value
of the target’s assets (and hence the value of its equity) under the incumbent management is
normalized to zero. Both assumptions will be relaxed later.
Tender oﬀers are the only admissible form of takeover.13 Without loss of generality, we
assume that the control majority is 50 percent. All shares carry the same number of votes. If
the raider gains control, the target’s assets increase in value by v > 0. For instance, the raider
may have a better use for the assets. The value improvement v is randomly distributed over
[0, v] with density f(v) and cumulative density F (v).
The medium of exchange is cash. We consider three possible sources of financing: (i) the
raider provides the cash out of his own pocket (the case considered in the literature), (ii) he
issues equity, and (iii) and he issues debt. We also allow combinations of (i)-(iii). We show that
12This argument has long been part of the folklore on Wall Street. See Hertzberg, D., Borrowing time: Takeover
targets find loading up on debt can fend oﬀ raiders, Wall Street Journal, September 10, 1985.
13Bebchuck and Hart (2001) show that a combination of tender oﬀer and proxy contest may implement eﬃcient
outcomes. In their model, target shareholders have a positive probability of being pivotal.
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the optimal financing mix takes a simple form: The raider first solves for the optimal amount of
debt. If (and only if) the funds from the debt issue are insuﬃcient to cover his needs, he finances
the residual with equity or cash out of his own pocket. Hence there is no need to introduce a
separate notation for equity. We assume that the raider issues zero-coupon debt with nominal
value D backed by the combined firm’s assets.14 Hence D is the amount of debt that appears
on the combined firm’s balance sheet. Capital markets are perfectly competitive.
The sequence of events is as follows. At t = 0 the raider chooses D and submits a bid b at
which he is willing to buy all shares subject to his holding a final stake greater than or equal
to 50 percent. That is, the raider makes a take-it-or-leave-it, conditional, unrestricted cash
oﬀer. The source of financing is public information, which implies target shareholders rationally
anticipate the combined firm’s capital structure.15
At t = 1 the target shareholders noncooperatively decide whether to tender their shares. We
follow Grossman and Hart (1980) and others in assuming that target shareholders are homo-
geneous and non-atomic, which implies that no shareholder perceives himself as pivotal. The
fraction of tendered shares is β. The Pareto-dominance criterion is used to select among multiple
equilibrium outcomes.16
At t = 2, if β < 1/2 the takeover fails. If β ≥ 1/2 the takeover succeeds, tendering share-
holders receive a total of βb, and the raider incurs administrative costs c < E[v]. As explained in
the Introduction, the raider and target subsequently merge. Nontendering shareholders retain
their original equity share, i.e., they end up with a fraction 1− β of the combined firm’s equity.
14 In practice, debtholders commit to buying the raider’s debt conditional on the tender oﬀer being successful.
If the tender oﬀer is not successful, no debt is issued (Bruck (1988, p.106-107), Wasserstein (1998, p.596-597).)
15The Oﬀer to Purchase, which is mailed directly to target shareholders, incorporates all essential information
contained in the Schedule 14D-1, which is the principal tender oﬀer regulatory document required by Section
14(d) of the Williams Act. This information includes “... 3. The source and amounts of the funds being used for
the oﬀer. 4. The purpose of the oﬀer, including any plans to acquire control, liquidate, sell the assets or merge
the target, or to make other major changes in the business or corporate structure of the target” (Wasserstein
(1998, p.638-639)).
16This is a standard way of ruling out “unreasonable” Nash equilibria (Grossman and Hart (1980, p.47)). For
instance, no matter how high the raider’s bid is, there is always a Nash equilibrium where nobody tenders: If
nobody else tenders, shareholder i is indiﬀerent between tendering and not tendering, since the takeover fails
no matter what. Likewise, Pareto dominance eliminates Nash equilibria in which the raider acquires the target
at a price below its pretakeover value. The superiority of debt financing is not driven by Pareto dominance. If
anything, Pareto dominance reduces the eﬀectiveness of debt financing in our model as it imposes a lower bound
on the admissible posttakeover share value.
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Contemporaneous with, and conditional upon, the merger, the raider implements his business
plan.17 As a consequence, the assets increase in value by E[v].
At t = 3 the value improvement v is realized. If v ≥ D debtholders receive D. If v < D
debtholders receive (1− k) v, where k ∈ (0, 1) indicates that a fraction of the asset value is lost
in bankruptcy. The qualitative results are the same with fixed bankruptcy costs.
As is well known, dilution of minority shares aﬀects the tender decision of dispersed share-
holders. Dilution creates “a divergence between the shareholders’ valuation and the raider’s
valuation of the postraid firm ...” (Grossman and Hart (1980, p.46), italics added). This allows
the raider to acquire the target’s shares at a price below his own valuation. Other potential
sources of profit are freezeouts (Yarrow (1985), Amihud, Kahan, and Sundaram (2003)), and
toeholds (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). To isolate the eﬀects of leverage from other sources of
profit, we initially abstract from dilution, freezeouts, and toeholds. Our benchmark is thus the
case studied in the literature in which tender oﬀers for widely held firms fail because they are
unprofitable: “[T]he conclusion that in the absence of dilution and initial holdings the bidder
cannot profit holds very generally, so long as target shareholders do not perceive themselves to
be pivotal” (Hirshleifer (1995, p.852)).
Let us illustrate the main point by solving the model for the simple case where v is known.
If the tender oﬀer is financed with cash out of the raider’s own pocket, the posttakeover (i.e.,
combined firm’s) share value is v. Since target shareholders tender only if b ≥ v, the takeover is
unprofitable. The same holds if the raider issues equity: Absent any simultaneous increase in
debt, the posttakeover share value is again v.
Suppose now the raider issues debt with nominal value D ≤ v. In the absence of uncertainty,
the proceeds from the debt issue are alsoD.We proceed backwards. If β < 1/2 the takeover fails.
By contrast, if β ≥ 1/2 the takeover succeeds, and the raider’s profit is Π = D−βb−c+β(v−D) :
He receivesD from the debt issue, pays βb for the tendered shares, incurs administrative expenses
of c, and holds a fraction β of the combined firm’s equity. We assume that any cash left over
after paying for tendered shares and administrative expenses is consumed by the raider.18 While
17See Section 7 on the legal implications of this timing. In practice, the raider can commit to his future course
of action through the Schedule 14D-1. Deviations from announcements made in the Schedule 14D-1 constitute a
violation of the law.
18 In practice, the raider might pay himself an upfront management fee. In the 1980s, LBO firms paid themselves
substantial upfront fees out of the funds raised, while in principle they could have waited and earned a higher ex-
post return instead (Kaplan and Stein (1993)). In the RJR Nabisco takeover, for instance, up-front fees amounted
to over $780 million (Burrough and Helyar (1990)).
9
convenient, this assumption is not critical. Below, we consider the other case where the raider
cannot consume upfront, i.e., where the funds can be used only to pay for tendered shares and
expenses. The qualitative results are the same.
Since shareholders tender only if the bid price equals or exceeds the posttakeover share value,
the raider must oﬀer b ≥ v − D. In equilibrium, the raider oﬀers just enough to make target
shareholders indiﬀerent. The equilibrium bid price is thus b∗ = v −D, in which case a fraction
β∗ ≥ 1/2 of shareholders tenders.19 The raider’s profit is Π = D − c, implying that D∗ = v.
(Because the raider pays a fair price on tendered shares, his profit is the same for all β ≥ 1/2.)
Finally, the takeover is financially feasible: The amount raised in the debt issue, D∗ = v, exceeds
the total financing needs β∗b∗ + c = c.
In the above example, the raider appropriates the full surplus, which implies all eﬃcient
takeovers take place. In Section 3, we show that this clean-cut result no longer obtains if the
value improvement v is stochastic. The raider then trades oﬀ a lower takeover premium against
higher bankruptcy costs. In equilibrium, the takeover premium is strictly positive. Similarly, in
Section 6 we show that if the value improvement depends endogenously on the raider’s eﬀort,
high leverage creates a debt overhang problem. To improve his incentives ex post, the raider
issues less debt ex ante. Again, the takeover premium is strictly positive.
If v is neither stochastic nor endogenous, the takeover premium may still be positive. If
bidders engage in Bertrand competition, for instance, the equilibrium bid price is b∗ = v − c,
which is also the takeover premium. Hence target shareholders appropriate the full eﬃciency
gain. What this shows is that the takeover premium may depend on many factors, such as,
e.g., bidding competition. Whether the takeover succeeds or not depends solely on the financing
choice, however. If the bid is financed with equity or cash out of the raider’s pocket, the raider
cannot recoup his transaction cost. Regardless of whether there is bidding competition or not,
the takeover then fails. By contrast, if the bid is financed with debt, eﬃcient takeovers are
possible. While bidding competition raises the takeover premium, bidders only compete to the
point where profits are zero. Hence under bidding competition cum debt financing bidders make
no profit, but at least they can recoup their transaction costs.
19Any β∗ ≥ 1/2 is an equilibrium outcome. Note that there cannot be an equilibrium in which the raider oﬀers
b = v −D but only a fraction β < 1/2 of shareholders tender. If this were true, the raider would want to raise
his bid to b = v −D + ε in order to resolve the shareholders’ indiﬀerence. In fact, he would want to choose the
smallest ε > 0 possible. Since such an ε does not exist, the unique equilibrium outcome given that b = v −D is
β∗ ≥ 1/2.
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Finally, if v is deterministic, exogenous, and there is no bidding competition, the takeover
premium is still positive if we rule out ex-ante consumption, i.e., if we add a constraint that
the raider can use his funds only to pay for tendered shares and administrative expenses. The
constraint is D ≤ βb + c. As the unconstrained solution derived above does not satisfy this
constraint, the constraint is binding. Inserting the binding constraint in the raider’s profit
function, we get Π = β(v −D) : As the raider is not allowed to consume ex ante, he maximizes
the value of his posttakeover shareholdings. The unique equilibrium outcome is D∗ = (v + c) /2
and b∗ = (v − c) /2, which implies the raider’s profit is Π = (v − c) /2. The raider and target
shareholders thus split the surplus in half. Hence ruling out ex-ante consumption reduces the
raider’s profit and raises the takeover premium. It does not, however, aﬀect our qualitative
result that leveraged takeovers for widely held firms can be profitable.
While the focus here is on cash oﬀers, our qualitative results also extend to exchange oﬀers
where target shareholders receive securities of the combined firm instead of cash. To illustrate
this, suppose again that v is known. (The argument generalizes to stochastic v.) If the medium
of exchange is equity, the value of the combined firm’s equity is v. Hence, target shareholders
tender only if they receive shares worth v, which implies the takeover is unprofitable. By contrast,
if the medium of exchange is debt, shareholders tender if the debt is worth as least as much as
the combined firm’s equity, whose value is v −D. Hence we obtain the constraint D ≥ v −D.
In equilibrium, the raider oﬀers just enough to make shareholders indiﬀerent. The unique
equilibrium outcome is therefore D∗ = v/2, which implies the raider’s profit is Π = v/2 − c.20
Hence some, but not all, eﬃcient takeovers take place.
3 Social versus Private Optimality of Debt Financing
In this section, we explore the role of costly bankruptcy as a natural counterforce to high leverage.
If bankruptcy is costly, the raider trades oﬀ a lower takeover premium against higher bankruptcy
costs. In equilibrium, the eﬃciency gain is shared between the raider and target shareholders,
which implies the takeover premium is strictly positive. And yet, we show that the raider takes
on too much debt compared to the social optimum. That is, social and private optimality of
20Since D∗ = v/2, the combined firm’s debt and equity have the same value, v/2. Hence target shareholders
are indiﬀerent between tendering and not tendering, which implies any β ≥ 1/2 is an equilibrium outcome. If a
fraction β of shareholders tender, the raider’s final holdings consist of a fraction β of the combined firm’s equity
and a fraction 1− β of the debt. Consequently, the raider’s profit is Π = β(v −D∗) + (1− β)D∗ − c = v/2− c.
11
debt financing do not coincide.
As usual, we proceed backwards. Given some debt level D, the posttakeover share value isZ v
D
(v −D)f(v)dv = v −D −
Z v
D
F (v)dv. (1)
The raider’s profit is then
Π = (1− k)
Z D
0
vf(v)dv +D
Z v
D
f(v)dv − βb− c+ β
Z v
D
(v −D)f(v)dv. (2)
The first two terms are the proceeds from his debt issue. Since debt is sold at a fair price, the
proceeds equal the expected value of the debt. With probability
R v
D f(v)dv the firm is solvent,
and debtholders receive the full value D. On the other hand, with probability
RD
0 f(v)dv the
firm is bankrupt, and debtholders receive (1 − k)v, which takes into account that a fraction
k of the asset value is lost in bankruptcy. The third and fourth terms represent the raider’s
expenses: He pays βb for the tendered shares and c to cover administrative expenses. The last
term represents the posttakeover value of raider’s equity stake.
As in Section 2, the equilibrium bid price must equal the posttakeover share value
b∗ =
Z v
D
(v −D)f(v)dv, (3)
which makes shareholders indiﬀerent between tendering and not tendering. Again, any β∗ ≥ 1/2
is then an equilibrium outcome. The raider’s profit is
Π = (1− k)
Z D
0
vf(v)dv +D
Z v
D
f(v)dv − c = D[1− kF (D)]− (1− k)
Z D
0
F (v)dv − c. (4)
This has an intuitive interpretation: As the raider makes no profit on tendered shares (by (3)
tendered shares are sold at a fair price), he maximimzes the expected value of his debt.
Diﬀerentiating (4) with respect to D, we obtain dΠ/dD = 1 − F (D) − kDf(D). Checking
the value of the derivative at D = 0 and D = v, we have that 1− F (0) − k0f(0) = 1 > 0 and
1 − F (v) − kvf(v) = −kvf(v) < 0. Accordingly, neither D = 0 nor D = v solve the raider’s
problem, which implies the optimal debt level is characterized by the first-order condition
1− F (D∗)− kD∗f(D∗) = 0, (5)
where D∗ ∈ (0, v) .21 Since D∗ < v we have that b∗ > 0. Hence the takeover premium is positive,
which implies the eﬃciency gain is split between the raider and target shareholders.
21 If k = 0, the first-order condition reduces to 1−F (D∗) = 0, implying that D∗ = v, i.e., the raider chooses the
maximum possible debt level. Inserting D∗ = v in (4), we obtain Π =
R v
0
vf(v)dv − c. Hence the raider captures
the full eﬃciency gain, which is the same result as in Section 2 where v was deterministic.
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We proceed with a discussion of our results.
(i) The takeover is financially feasible. That is, whenever the raider’s profit is positive, he
can also raise the necessary funds to pay for the tendered shares and administrative expenses.
By (4), if the raider’s profit is positive at D∗, the proceeds from his debt issue are suﬃcient to
cover the transaction costs c. The remainder, D∗[1− kF (D∗)]− (1− k) RD∗0 F (v)dv− c, can be
used towards paying for the tendered shares, which cost β∗b∗ altogether. If this is not suﬃcient,
the raider can either issue equity or pay the diﬀerence out of his own pocket. If he issues equity,
equity investors provide the diﬀerence β∗b∗ − [D∗[1 − kF (D∗)] − (1 − k) RD∗0 F (v)dv − c]. In
return, they receive a share α of the raider’s equity stake β∗.22 Given that capital markets are
perfectly competitive, α is given by
α =
β∗b∗ −D∗[1− kF (D∗)] + (1− k) RD∗0 F (v)dv + c
β∗b∗
.
The above argument holds generally: Whenever the raider’s profit is nonnegative, the
takeover is also financially feasible. If the raider needs additional funds, he either issues eq-
uity at a fair price or provides the funds out of his own pocket. As financial feasibility can
always be ensured, we ignore this issue in the remainder of the paper.
(ii) The takeover takes place if and only if the eﬃciency gain
R v
0 vf(v)dv − c is suﬃciently
large.23 We can rewrite the raider’s profit (4) as
Π =
Z v
0
vf(v)dv − c| {z }
Eﬃciency Gain
−
Z v
D∗
(v −D∗) f(v)dv| {z }
Takeover Premium
− k
Z D∗
0
vf(v)dv| {z }
Bankruptcy Costs
. (6)
At the optimal debt level D∗, the takeover premium and bankruptcy costs are both positive. If
the eﬃciency gain is too small, the raider’s profit is thus negative. Holding
R v
0 vf(v)dv constant
and varying c, we have that (a) if c → R v0 vf(v)dv the takeover always fails, (b) if c → 0 the
takeover takes place regardless of k, and especially, (c) there exists a unique value
c :=
Z v
0
vf(v)dv −
Z v
D∗
(v −D∗) f(v)dv − k
Z D∗
0
vf(v)dv
such that the takeover takes place if and only if c ≤ c.
(iii) The amount of debt taken on by the raider exceeds the socially optimal level. While
bankruptcy costs are a social cost, the takeover premium is merely a wealth transfer between
22Equity investors may be thought of as limited partners in the raider’s LBO firm. In this case, the LBO firm
acquires a fraction β∗ of the target’s shares, of which the raider owns (1−α)β∗ and the limited partners own αβ∗.
23The eﬃciency gain is an exogenous variable representing the possible value improvement under the takeover.
It does not include expected bankruptcy costs, which depend on the raider’s optimal debt level D∗.
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the raider and target shareholders. The socially optimal debt level Ds is therefore the smallest
debt level at which the takeover takes place. Formally, Ds is given by24
Π = (1− k)
Z Ds
0
vf(v)dv +Ds
Z v
Ds
f(v)dv − c = 0. (7)
By, (6) the raider minimizes the sum of takeover premium and bankruptcy costs. That is,
the raider takes on additional debt as long as the reduction in takeover premium outweighs the
increase in bankruptcy cost. Unless by coincidence ΠD=D∗ = 0–in which case private and social
optimality coincide–the raider thus takes on too much debt compared to the social optimum.
We summarize our results in two propositions. The first characterizes the (privately optimal)
equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the raider trades oﬀ higher bankruptcy costs against a lower
takeover premium. The eﬃciency gain is split between the raider and target shareholders, which
implies that some, but not all, eﬃcient takeovers take place. Precisely, the takeover takes place
if and only if the eﬃciency gain is suﬃciently large.
The second proposition characterizes the tension between social and private optimality.
Proposition 2. As the takeover premium is a pure wealth transfer between the raider and target
shareholders, the raider takes on too much debt compared to the social optimum.
We finally examine the comparative statics of bankruptcy costs. Diﬀerentiating (3) and (5)
with respect to k, we have
db∗
dk
= −dD
∗
dk
[1− F (D∗)] = D
∗ [1− F (D∗)]
f (D∗) + k [f 0 (D∗)D∗ + f (D∗)]
> 0, (8)
where f (D∗) + k [f 0 (D∗)D∗ + f (D∗)] > 0 is the second order condition for a maximum in (5).
Provided the takeover takes place, target shareholders are thus better oﬀ in regimes with high
bankruptcy costs. If bankruptcy costs are high, the raider chooses less debt, which results in a
higher takeover premium. On the other hand, by (6) the raider’s profit is decreasing in k. Hence
if bankruptcy costs are too high, the takeover might not take place.
Proposition 3. An increase in bankruptcy costs reduces the raider’s profit and thus the likelihood
that the takeover takes place. Given that the takeover takes place, however, an increase in
bankruptcy costs raises the takeover premium and therefore benefits target shareholders.
24Since ΠD=0 < 0 and ΠD=D∗ ≥ 0, existence of Ds follows from continuity.
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Whether target shareholders ultimately benefit from bankruptcy costs depends on c, and
thus on the size of the eﬃciency gain. As the raider’s profit is decreasing in k, there exists a
critical threshold k(c) such that the takeover takes place if and only if k ≤ k(c). By Proposition
3, if k < k(c) target shareholders unambiguously benefit from an increase in k. By contrast, if
k > k(c) the takeover fails, and target shareholders are better oﬀ if k drops below k(c).
The critical threshold k(c) is the value of k satisfying
Π = (1− k)
Z D∗(k)
0
vf(v)dv +D∗(k)
Z v
D∗(k)
f(v)dv − c = 0, (9)
where D∗(k) is given by (5). If c ≤ D∗(1) R vD∗(1) f(v)dv the raider’s profit is positive at k = 1
(and hence at k < 1), implying that k(c) = 1. Conversely, if c > D∗(1)
R v
D∗(1) f(v)dv the critical
threshold is k(c) < 1. Setting k = k(c) and diﬀerentiating (9) with respect to c yields
dk
dc
=
1
dD∗
dk
h
1− F (D∗)− kD∗f(D∗)
i
− RD∗(k)0 vf(v)dv < 0,
where the sign follows from (5). To summarize, if c is low–in which case the eﬃciency gain is
large–target shareholders always benefit from an increase in bankruptcy costs. If c is above a
certain level, target shareholders benefit from an increase in bankruptcy costs only if bankruptcy
costs are below k < 1, where k is a decreasing function of c.
4 Toeholds, Leverage, and Equilibrium Bid Price
In the previous section, leverage is the only possible source of profit. Abstracting from other
sources of profit allowed us to study the eﬀects of leverage in isolation.
In this section, we examine the interplay between two sources of profit: leverage and toeholds.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that a toehold may increase the raider’s profit, as he does not
face a holdout problem on shares which he already owns at the tender oﬀer. We follow Shleifer
and Vishny and Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) by taking the raider’s toehold as given. That is,
we do not model the optimal toehold acquisition strategy.25
The setup is the same as in Section 3. The only diﬀerence is that the raider now owns an
initial toehold ω < 1/2 in the target firm. To minimize the use of new notation, we denote the
total fraction of shares owned by the raider by β , which includes the fraction ω ≤ β already
owned prior to the tender oﬀer.
25On this, see Ravid and Spiegel (1999) and the literature cited therein.
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The posttakeover share value is again given by (1). The raider’s profit is
Π = (1− k)
Z D
0
vf(v)dv +D
Z v
D
f(v)dv − (β − ω)b− c+ β
Z v
D
(v −D)f(v)dv.
In the tender oﬀer, the raider now only acquires a fraction β − ω of the target’s shares. By
the same argument as before, the raider bids exactly the posttakeover share value, which makes
shareholders indiﬀerent between tendering and not tendering. The raider’s profit is then
Π = (1− k)
Z D
0
vf(v)dv +D
Z v
D
f(v)dv − c+ ω
Z v
D
(v −D)f(v)dv. (10)
The raider makes again no profit on tendered shares due to the holdout problem. What is
diﬀerent compared to the previous section is that the raider now maximizes the expected value
of his debt plus the value of his toehold.
Diﬀerentiating (10) with respect to D, we obtain dΠ/dD = (1 − ω)[1 − F (D)] − kDf(D),
where dΠ/dD|D=0 = 1 − ω > 0 and dΠ/dD|D=v = −kvf(v) < 0. Hence neither D = 0 nor
D = v solve the raider’s problem, which implies the optimal debt level is given by
(1− ω)[1− F (D∗)]− kD∗f(D∗) = 0, (11)
where D∗ ∈ (0, v) .
Diﬀerentiating (11) with respect to the toehold, we obtain
dD∗
dω
=
1− F (D∗)
−f(D∗)(1− ω)− k [f(D∗) +D∗f 0(D∗)] < 0, (12)
where −f(D∗)(1−ω)− k [f(D∗) +D∗f 0(D∗)] < 0 is the second-order condition for a maximum
in (11). Hence the equilibrium debt level is decreasing in the toehold. The intuition is straight-
forward. The presence of a toehold reduces the benefits of leverage, since the raider only profits
from the value reduction of the fraction 1− ω of shares he does not already own. To illustrate
this, let us rewrite (10) as
Π =
Z v
0
vf(v)dv − c| {z }
Eﬃciency Gain
− (1− ω)
Z v
D∗
(v −D∗) f(v)dv| {z }
Takeover Premium
− k
Z D∗
0
vf(v)dv| {z }
Bankruptcy Costs
. (13)
As can be easily seen from (13), a reduction in the takeover premium by one dollar increases the
raider’s profit by only 1− ω dollars. The cost of leverage, on the other hand, remains the same
as the toehold has no eﬀect on bankruptcy costs. Consequently, less debt is raised compared to
Section 3.26 Put diﬀerently, leverage not only reduces the posttakeover value of minority shares,
26This follows from comparing the raider’s profit function with and without toehold, (10) and (4), respectively.
The only diﬀerence between the two is that (10) has an additional term ω
R v
D
(v − D)f(v)dv representing the
posttakeover value of the raider’s toehold, which is decreasing in D.
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but also the posttakeover value of the raider’s own toehold. This constitutes an additional cost
of leverage that was absent in the previous analysis. Consequently, the raider issues less debt.
Since by (3) the equilibrium bid price is decreasing in the raider’s debt, the presence of a toehold
implies a higher bid price, and thus a higher takeover premium.
Proposition 4. An increase in the raider’s toehold reduces the amount of debt taken on by the
raider and increases the equilibrium bid price, and therefore the takeover premium.
Proposition 4 stands in contrast to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Hirshleifer and Titman
(1990), who both suggest that the takeover premium is decreasing in the raider’s toehold. In
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998), on the other hand, the bid price is independent of the
toehold. Finally, in Burkart’s (1995) overbidding model, the equilibrium bid price is increasing
in the toehold, like in our model.
The empirical evidence is mixed. Franks and Harris (1989) find that takeover premia for bids
with toeholds below 30 percent are higher than premia for bids without a toehold, but lower
than for bids with toeholds above 30 percent. Walking and Edmister (1985), on the other hand,
find a negative relation between toeholds and takeover premium. Either result must be viewed
with caution. As Franks and Harris (p.243) point out, “part of the gain to targets occurs at
the initiation of the toehold, which may be well before our month zero.” Consistent with this,
Schwert (1996) finds that pre-bid runups constitute on average fifty percent of the premium
paid in successful takeovers. We are not aware of empirical work testing the relation between
toeholds and the total (i.e., runup plus markup) takeover premium.
A toehold has two eﬀects on the raider’s profit. One the one hand, it raises the takeover
premium (Proposition 4). On the other, there are fewer shares on which the takeover premium
must be paid. In what follows, we analyze the overall eﬀect of a toehold on the raider’s profit,
and hence on the likelihood that the takeover takes place. By the envelope theorem,
dΠ
dω
¯¯¯¯
D=D∗
=
Z v
D
(v −D)f(v)dv > 0.
A change in leverage induced by a small change in the toehold has a zero eﬀect on the raider’s
profit. The only first-order eﬀect is thus the direct, positive eﬀect that the takeover premium
must be paid on fewer shares.27
27We have implicitly assumed that the raider can acquire the toehold at the pretakeover share price. The result
holds as long as the acquisition price is below the posttakeover share value. For a model in which noise trading
limits the price impact of pretakeover share acquisitions, see Kyle and Vila (1991).
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Proposition 5. A higher toehold increases the raider’s profit, and thus the likelihood that the
takeover takes place.
Proposition 5 is consistent with empirical evidence by Walkling (1985) and Choi (1991).
Both find a positive relation between the acquirer’s toehold and the likelihood of a takeover.
5 Target versus Bidder Leverage
To examine the eﬀect of the target’s net worth on the raider’s borrowing capacity, we now relax
the assumption that the target has no assets or debt. As the target management can manipulate
the net worth (e.g., by selling assets or undertaking a leveraged recapitalization), the analysis
also sheds light on the target’s ability to ward oﬀ hostile takeovers.
Denote the target’s assets in place by V. To provide a general framework in which not only
the raider’s acquisition debt, but also the target’s existing debt is risky, we assume that V is
distributed on [0, V ], where V can be either finite or infinite. The density and cumulative density
functions are h(V ) and H(V ), respectively.
The value improvement brought about by the raider is modelled as a first-order stochastic
dominance (FOSD) shift in the distribution of the assets. If the takeover succeeds, the new den-
sity and cumulative density functions are g(V ) and G(V ), respectively, where G(V ) dominates
H(V ) in the sense of FOSD. Accordingly, if the takeover succeeds, the expected value of the
assets in place increases. The (overall) eﬃciency gain isZ V
0
V [g(V )− h (V )] dV − c =
Z V
0
[H(V )−G (V )] dV − c.
The target has existing debt B, which is senior to any additional debt taken on by the
raider.28 We can rewrite the eﬃciency gain asZ V
0
V [g(V )− h (V )] dV − c| {z }
Total Eﬃciency Gain
=
Z V
B
(V −B) [g(V )− h (V )] dV − c| {z }
Appropriable Part of Eﬃciency Gain
28This biases our results as much as possible against a successful takeover. If the raider could additionally dilute
the target’s existing debt, his profit would be even greater. Empirically, it seems that expropriation of target
debtholders is a second-order eﬀect. While Asquith and Wizman (1990) and Warga and Welch (1993) find that
target bondholders indeed make small losses, these losses can explain only a negligible fraction (three and seven
percent, respectively) of the shareholder gains. The reason is that target bondholders are typically protected via
covenants (Smith and Warner (1979)). Accordingly, Warga and Welch conclude that “the primary impetus for
LBOs in our period was not the exploitation of holders of public debt” (p.979).
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+ (1− k)
Z B
0
V [g(V )− h (V )] dV +B
Z V
B
[g(V )− h (V )] dV| {z }
Change in Value of Target’s Existing Debt
+ k
Z B
0
V [g(V )− h (V )] dV.| {z }
Change in Bankruptcy Costs
The first row on the right-hand side represents the increase in share value minus transaction
costs (“appropriable part of eﬃciency gain”). This value increase is to be divided between the
raider and target shareholders.
We can rewrite the second row as
(1− k)
Z B
0
[H(V )−G (V )] dV +Bk [H(B)−G (B)] > 0,
where the sign follows from FOSD. Hence even if bankruptcy costs are zero and the raider
receives the full appropriable eﬃciency gain, his profit is still smaller than the overall eﬃciency
gain. This is in contrast to Section 3, where all eﬃcient takeovers materialized when k was zero.
The reason is straightforward. If the target has outstanding debt, a favorable shift in the asset
distribution makes the target debt safer. But if a fraction of the value gains goes to debtholders,
the takeover might not be profitable even if target shareholders receive nothing.
Proposition 6. If the target firm has outstanding debt, a fraction of the eﬃciency gain goes
to target debtholders. Hence even if bankruptcy costs are zero and target shareholders receive
nothing, some eﬃcient takeovers will not take place.
In the remainder of this section, we analyze the eﬀect of target leverage on the raider’s debt
capacity, i.e., his ability to raise debt by pledging assets of the combined firm as collateral. As
previously, the raider issues debt with face value D.
The posttakeover share value equals the diﬀerence between the asset value V and the sum
of the initial target debt B and the additional debt D issued by the raider, i.e.,Z V
B+D
(V −B −D) g (V ) dV. (14)
Analogous to (2), the raider’s expected profit is then
Π = (1− k)
Z B+D
B
(V −B) g(V )dV +D
Z V
B+D
g(V )dV (15)
−βb− c+ β
Z V
B+D
(V −B −D)g(V )dV.
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Consider next the tender game. Hitherto, the Pareto dominance criterion has ruled out
“unreasonable” Nash equilibria in which the takeover fails irrespective of how high the raider’s
bid is. If the target has existing assets, Pareto dominance–besides ruling out equilibria of the
sort above–additionally rules out equilibria where target shareholders sell their firm at a price
below the pretakeover share value. Another, complementary argument for why bids below the
pretakeover value appear unrealistic is bidding competition. If the target can be acquired for
less than its pretakeover value, entry by rival bidders will drive up the price. Whether we assume
bidding competition or Pareto dominance, the outcome is the same: Bids below the pretakeover
share value fail.29
If bids below the pretakeover share value fail, the raider has no incentive to overleverage:
Adding more debt does not reduce the takeover premium, but only increases bankruptcy costs.
Consequently, the posttakeover value will always (weakly) exceed the pretakeover value.
By our usual argument, the raider bids exactly the posttakeover share value, which makes
shareholders indiﬀerent between tendering and not tendering:
b∗ =
Z V
B+D
(V −B −D) g (V )dV (16)
Again, any β∗ ≥ 1/2 constitutes an equilibrium outcome. Inserting (16) in (15), we obtain
Π = (1− k)
Z B+D
B
(V −B) g(V )dV +D
Z V
B+D
g(V )dV − c. (17)
We can rewrite (17) conveniently as
Π =
Z V
B
(V −B) [g(V )− h (V )] dV − c| {z }
Appropriable Part of Eﬃciency Gain
− k
Z B+D
B
(V −B) g(V )dV| {z }
Bankruptcy Costs
(18)
−
"Z V
B+D
(V −B −D) g (V ) dV −
Z V
B
(V −B)h (V ) dV
#
| {z }
Takeover Premium
.
By inspection, the appropriable part of the eﬃciency is decreasing inB. This is the debt overhang
problem in Proposition 6. What is less clear is whether the sum of the three terms in (18)–
and hence the raider’s overall profit–is decreasing in B. In the Appendix, we show that this is
indeed the case. The intuition is simple: An increase in target leverage limits the raider’s ability
29This biases our results again against successful takeovers, since it limits the extent to which the raider can
make a profit.
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to pledge target assets as collateral for his debt, and therefore his ability to borrow. This is
summarized in the following proposition, whose proof is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 7. An increase in target leverage limits the raider’s ability to pledge target assets
as collateral, thereby reducing his profit. As a consequence, fewer takeovers take place.
Proposition 7 is consistent with available empirical evidence. Palepu (1986), Billet (1996),
and Safieddine and Titman (1999) all find a significant negative relation between target leverage
and takeover likelihood.
This section is related to Israel (1991), Stulz (1988), Harris and Raviv (1988), and Zwiebel
(1996). Israel assumes that the eﬃciency gain is divided between the raider and target sharehold-
ers according to a preset rule. Hence there is no free-rider problem. In the models by Stulz and
Harris and Raviv, target management issues debt to repurchase equity. The target management
does not participate in the buyback, which increases its voting power and fosters entrenchment.
In Zwiebel’s paper, the target management issues debt to commit not to undertake ineﬃcient
investments, thus reducing the scope for eﬃcient takeovers.
All of the above papers assume that the acquisition is financed with cash out of the raider’s
pocket. Our model, by contrast, suggests that target leverage matters because it reduces the
raider’s borrowing capacity. This idea has long been part of the folklore on Wall Street: “[T]he
assumption of debt reduces the target company’s debt capacity. If the hostile bidder planned
to use the target’s surplus debt capacity to fund the acquisition of control, the recapitalization
can be an insurmountable barrier” (Wasserstein (1998, p.729)).
Rather than issuing debt, the target management can also sell oﬀ assets to impair the raider’s
borrowing capacity.30 It is easy to see that asset sales have a similar eﬀect as an increase in target
leverage. Suppose the remaining target assets after the asset sale have value max {0, V −B}
with corresponding density h(V ) and g(V ) before and after the takeover, respectively. If B = V
all assets have been sold, while if B = 0 none have been sold. In other words, the higher is
B, the more assets have been sold.31 Evidently, the model is isomorphic to our previous model
where the target management issues debt. In particular, the raider can only improve the value
of those assets that have not been sold, implying that the appropriable part of the eﬃciency
gain shrinks to
R V
B (V −B) [g(V )− h (V )]dV − c. The raider’s profit is again given by (18), and
30A special, but important class of asset sales are share repurchases. The asset “sold” in this case is cash. For
a discussion of share repurchases see, e.g., Bagwell (1991).
31A richer model of asset sales would allow the target management to sell oﬀ arbitrary subets of [0, V [.
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all results remain the same.
Proposition 8. A defensive asset sale limits the raider’s ability to pledge target assets as
collateral, thereby reducing his profit. As a consequence, fewer takeovers take place.
There exist numerous examples where firms disposed of cash or assets when facing a takeover
threat. For instance, Polaroid bought 22 percent of its shares and put them into a new employee
stock ownership plan when threatened by a raider. Likewise, the defensive restructurings by
oil companies such as Phillips or Unocal in the 1980s involved substantial increases in cash
dividends and the repurchase of equity in the range of 25 to 53 percent. Another example is
the sale of crown jewels. For example, in the 1982 takeover fight for Marathon Oil, Marathon
granted its white knight U.S. Steel the right to buy Marathon’s interest in the valuable Yates
oil fields at a bargain price of $2.8 billion if an acquirer other than U.S. Steel were to hold more
than 50 percent of Marathon’s stock (Wasserstein (1998)).
6 Incentive Eﬀects of Leverage
In Section 3, we argued that bankruptcy costs pose a natural counterforce to high leverage. In
this section, we show that incentive problems on the part of the raider have a similar eﬀect.
If the value improvement depends on the raider’s eﬀort, high leverage creates a debt overhang
problem, as part of the benefits from the raider’s eﬀort goes to debtholders. This dulls the
raider’s incentives. To counteract this, the raider issues less debt ex ante.
The model is similar to Section 3, except that the value improvement is now endogenous.
Following Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1998), we assume that the raider–after having acquired
control–exerts noncontractible eﬀort e ∈ [0, 1] to improve the value of the assets. Precisely, we
assume that the value improvement is v with probability e and zero with probability 1 − e.
To isolate the incentive eﬀects of debt from the eﬀect studied in Section 3, we abstract from
bankruptcy costs. For the same reason, we also assume that the raider owns no toehold. To
obtain a closed-form solution for the bid price and equilibrium debt level, we assume quadratic
eﬀort costs c(e) = ξe2/2, where ξ > v ensures that the optimal eﬀort level is characterized by
an interior solution.
In a first-best world, eﬀort is verifiable. The first-best eﬀort maximizes ev− ξe2/2, implying
that eFB = v/ξ. The expected value improvement is thus v2/ξ. Absent any bankruptcy costs, the
optimal debt level is DFB = v. The raider’s profit equals the proceeds from his debt issue minus
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eﬀort and transaction costs, eFBDFB − ξe2FB/2− c = v2/2ξ − c. Hence the raider appropriates
the full (first-best) eﬃciency gain, which implies all eﬃcient takeovers takes place.
To derive the second-best solution, we proceed backwards. We begin with the raider’s eﬀort
choice. At this stage, the raider already owns a fraction β of the firm’s equity, and tendering
shareholders have already been paid. The raider maximizes βe(v−D)− ξe/2, which implies the
optimal second-best eﬀort is given by
e∗ =
β(v −D)
ξ
. (19)
(We assume that D < v. If D ≥ v, debtholders cannot break even.)
By (19), the raider’s eﬀort is increasing in his equity stake β and decreasing in D. As β
increases, the raider internalizes more of the value improvement generated by his eﬀort. On the
other hand, the higher the debt, the more gains from his eﬀort go to debtholders, since a higher
eﬀort makes the debt safer. As the raider does not internalize this externality, there exists a
debt overhang problem similar to that in Section 5. The following holds for any D ≥ 0.
Proposition 9. The raider expends less eﬀort than in a first-best world without incentive
problems. The raider’s eﬀort is increasing in his equity stake, but decreasing in the amount of
debt, since part of the benefits from his eﬀort go to debtholders.
Consider now the shareholders’ tender decision. When deciding whether to tender or not,
shareholders compare the raider’s bid b to the rationally expected posttakeover share value
e∗(v − D). The raider’s eﬀort e∗, in turn, depends on the fraction of tendered shares β. If
b < e∗β<1/2(v −D) the bid fails. Conversely, if b > e∗β=1(v −D) the bid succeeds and all shares
are tendered. Both of these bids are dominated and can be ruled out.32 Finally, for each
bid b between e∗β<1/2(v −D) and e∗β=1(v −D) there exists a unique Pareto-dominant rational
expectations equilibrium outcome in which a fraction β of the shares is tendered such that the
posttakeover share value eβ∗(v − D) equals the raider’s bid (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi
(1998)). Target shareholders are then indiﬀerent between tendering and not tendering. We call
this condition free-rider condition:
b = e∗(v −D). (20)
Inserting the first-order condition (19) in the free-rider condition (20), the equilibrium frac-
tion of tendered shares is
β∗ =
ξb
(v −D)2 . (21)
32b > e∗β=1(v −D) is dominated since the raider bids more than the highest possible posttakeover share value.
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The share supply curve β∗(b) is upward sloping: By the free-rider condition (20), the bid price
must equal the posttakeover share value. A higher bid price thus implies a higher posttakeover
share value. But a higher posttakeover share value, in turn, implies a higher β∗, since e∗ is
increasing in β∗ by (19). Moreover, the supply of shares is increasing in D: Debt reduces the
posttakeover share value e∗(v − D), both directly and indirectly by decreasing e∗. To ensure
that the posttakeover share value remains equal to the bid price, a greater fraction of the shares
must be tendered.
Proposition 10. In the unique Pareto-dominant rational expectations equilibrium outcome of
the tender game, the fraction of tendered shares is strictly increasing both in the bid price and
in the raider’s debt.
The free-rider condition (20) implies that the raider makes no profit on tendered shares. His
profit consists of the proceeds from the debt issue, e∗D, minus eﬀort and transaction costs. The
raider solves
max
b,D
Π = e∗D − ξ e
∗2
2
− c
subject to (19), (20) and β ≤ 1. Inserting (19) and (20) into the raider’s objective function and
partially diﬀerentiating with respect to b and D, we obtain
∂Π
∂b
=
D
v −D − ξ
b
(v −D)2
and
∂Π
∂D
=
b
v −D
Ã
1 +
D
v −D − ξ
b
(v −D)2
!
. (22)
The solution is now straightforward: The optimal bid price is given by the first-order
condition ∂Π/∂b = 0, implying that b∗ = D(v − D)/ξ. Inserting this in (22), we obtain
∂Π/∂D = D/ξ > 0. Hence the optimal debt level is determined by the binding constraint
β ≤ 1, which transforms to D ≤ v/2 by (21) and b∗ = D(v −D)/ξ. Consequently, the solution
is D∗ = v/2, b∗ = v2/4ξ, e∗ = v/2ξ, and β∗ = 1, i.e., all shares are tendered.33 Inserting the
solution back into the raider’s profit function, we obtain Π∗ = v2/8ξ − c.
We conclude with a discussion of the optimal solution.
(i) Leverage has both a direct, negative and an indirect, positive eﬀect on the raider’s eﬀort.
The direct eﬀect is that–holding β constant–leverage creates a debt overhang problem. The
33This is in contrast to Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998), where only 50 percent of the shares are tendered
in equilibrium.
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indirect eﬀect is that an increase in leverage increases β, and thus the raider’s incentives. This
is relevant only if β ≤ 1 or, equivalently, if D ≤ v/2. If D > v/2, only the negative, direct eﬀect
is present.34 Accordingly, if D is high, leverage unambiguously reduces the raider’s eﬀort.
(ii) Compared to the first-best, the raider issues less debt. The first-best level of debt is
DFB = v, and therefore twice as high as the second-best level D∗ = v/2: To counteract the
adverse incentive eﬀects of high leverage in (i), the raider reduces his debt to D∗ = v/2.
(iii) The reduction in leverage to D∗ = v/2 raises the takeover premium. In the absence of
bankruptcy costs, the first-best takeover premium is zero. The second-best takeoever premium,
by contrast, is positive and equal to b∗ = v2/4ξ.
(iv) The overall eﬃciency gain is less than under the first-best. The first-best eﬃciency gain
is v2/2ξ−c, while the second-best eﬃciency gain is only b∗+Π∗ = 3v2/8ξ−c. This is due to the
fact that, compared to the first-best, the raider exerts less eﬀort (e∗ = v/2ξ versus eFB = v/ξ).
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 11. The optimal debt level is determined by a tradeoﬀ : Leverage increases the
raider’s equilibrium equity stake, and thus his incentives. On the other hand, it creates a debt
overhang problem, which dulls the raider’s incentives. If the leverage is suﬃciently high, only
the negative eﬀect is present. To counteract this–and to improve his incentives ex post–the
raider uses less debt ex ante. This, in turn, raises the takeover premium.
7 Legal Foundations
As argued in the Introduction, the takeover mechanism analyzed here is widely used in LBOs,
and is therefore common. We now argue that it is legal. We focus on Delaware law, where more
than half of the Fortune 500 companies are incorporated. Laws in other states are similar. Two
issues must addressed, both relating to the second-step merger following the tender oﬀer: (i)
legality of the merger itself, and (ii) legality of the terms of the merger.
The power to eﬀect the merger is given by the law. A regular (i.e., long-form) merger must
be approved by a simple majority.35 Hence if the raider controls a majority of the target’s
shares, approval is guaranteed. If the raider controls 90 percent or more of the target’s shares,
34For the quadratic eﬀort cost function used here, the positive, indirect eﬀect dominates the negative, direct
eﬀect for all β ≤ 1 or, equivalently, for all D ≤ v/2, which is why D ≤ v/2 is also the solution.
35Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 251.
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he can alternatively eﬀect a short-form merger.36
Depending on the type of merger, minority shareholders have appraisal rights or the right to
sue the raider for breach of fiduciary duty. In a regular stock-for-stock merger, target sharehold-
ers have no appraisal rights when the target is a listed company.37 However, under the “entire
fairness” standard laid out in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., the raider must establish that the
merger was fair, which includes both “fair dealing” and “fair price”.38 In a short-form merger,
minority shareholders have appraisal rights, but–according to case law–no right to sue the
raider for breach of fiduciary duty.39 In an appraisal proceeding, the court independently deter-
mines the “fair value” of the target’s shares. Whether the issue is one of appraisal or breach of
fiduciary duty, it therefore ultimately boils down to finding a “fair value” for the target’s shares
(Bebchuk and Kahan (2000)).
What is a “fair value”? According to Delaware law, “the Court shall appraise the shares,
determining their fair value exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger” (Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 262 (h), italics added). Hence the law grants
minority shareholders no right to a share in the merger gains. Consequently, a fair value is any
value under which minority shareholders are not worse oﬀ than before the merger (Mahoney
and Weinstein (1999)). In our model, the raider implements his business plan contemporaneous
with, and conditional on, the merger.40 At the date of the merger, the value of minority shares
36Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 253. A short-form merger requires no vote: It is “a simple, fast and inexpensive process
for accomplishing a merger” (Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001)).
37Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 262(b), (1)-(2).
38Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d, 701 (Del. 1983).
39Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001). This is provided there is no fraud and the
oﬀer is accompanied by complete disclosure of all material facts.
40On the timing of the raider’s value improvement, see Section 2. In practice, such timing is indeed important.
In Cede v. Technicolor, the court awarded minority shareholders a share in the merger gains, arguing that the
raider’s business plan was already in eﬀect at the date of the merger, and thus de facto part of the target’s
going concern (Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996)). The received view among legal
scholars is that the raider could have avoided this verdict by waiting with the implementation of his plan until
the merger is completed (e.g., Mahoney and Weinstein (1999)). In our model, this issue does not arise since the
business plan (value improvement) is implemented contemporaneous with the merger. Hence the correct going
concern–and thus the benchmark against which the postmerger value must be compared according to Delaware
law (§ 262(h))–is the pretakeover share value excluding the raider’s value improvement. This value is zero in our
model–except for Section 5, where it is
R V
B
(V −B)h (V ) dV > 0. Since the postmerger value never falls below
this benchmark–in fact, it is strictly higher–minority shareholders maintain their going concern value, which
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thus increases from zero (pretakeover value) to (1−β)E[v−D] (postmerger value). Since in our
model E[v −D] > 0, minority shareholders are never worse oﬀ. In fact, they are strictly better
oﬀ compared to before the merger.41
Legal aspects are also important when it comes to the coexistence of diﬀerent mechanisms
that can potentially mitigate the free-rider problem. Consider first dilution. According to
Grossman and Hart (1980), the raider may pay himself a large salary out of the company’s funds
or issue shares to himself, sell the company’s assets at below their true value to another company
which he owns, or sell the firm’s output at an artificially low price, again to a company which
he owns. As has been noted elswhere (e.g., Bebchuk (1985), Amihud, Kahan, and Sundaram
(2003)), such practices are unlawful as they violate the raider’s fiduciary duty vis-à-vis minority
shareholders. While the law may not always be enforced perfectly, any argument in which
dilution plays a central role must address the notion of imperfect law enforcement explicitly.
In a freezeout, the raider optimally oﬀers the same back-end price as in the tender oﬀer
(e.g., Amihud, Kahan, and Sundaram (2003)).42 Suppose the optimal back-end price is P <
E[v−D]. (For simplicity, we have expressed the back-end price in terms of the firm’s total equity;
minority shareholders receive only their pro rata share (1−β)P .) While a back-end price below
the posttakeover share value does not violate the law, the law provides no guarantee that the
freezeout will go through at this price.43 Suppose with probability 1 − ε the freezeout goes
through at P . With an arbitrarily small probability ε > 0, however, the court awards minority
shareholders the full posttakeover share value E[v −D] (precisely: their pro rata share 1− β).
In this case, it is a dominant strategy for target shareholders not to tender. (In game-theoretic
parlor: The equilibrium with back-end price P < E[v −D] is not trembling-hand perfect). To
implies § 262(h) is satisfied.
41What if the value improvement is common knowledge to the shareholders and the raider, but hard to verify
vis-à-vis a court? The raider’s debt, on the other hand, is verifiable. In the event of a litigation, the raider might
be able to prove that minority shareholders are not worse oﬀ by using the postmerger share price as evidence. If
the share price correctly reflects all fundamentals, an appraisal will generate the same result. In the model, we
abstract from such issues. Along with the rest of the literature, we assume that the value improvement exists and
is verifiable ex post.
42 If the back-end price is lower than the tender oﬀer price, the oﬀer is coercive. Coercive oﬀers are inconsistent
with the notion of a “fair price” (In re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, C.A. 19876 (Del. 2002)).
Moreover, they are often infeasible due to “fair-price” provisions in corporate charters or state takeover laws.
43This is reflected in recent case law. See Cede v. Technicolor (op.cit.) and ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751
A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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make target shareholders indiﬀerent between tendering and not tendering, the raider must set
both the bid price in the tender oﬀer and the back-end price equal to E[v −D]. The takeover
premium then again depends on the amount of debt taken on by the raider. While this is merely
a model sketch, it illustrates how freezeouts and leverage might interact.
8 Conclusion
The high use of leverage is one of the characteristic features of the 1980s takeover wave (Scherer
(1988), Holmström and Kaplan (2001)). And yet, relatively little is known about what role, if
any, leverage plays for the takeover process. In this paper, we show that–by borrowing against
value improvements arising from the takeover–the raider can appropriate part of the takeover
gains. Eﬀectively, the raider does not just bring in a value improvement (as assumed in the
literature), but a value improvement that comes with a pre-existing liability. The crux is that
the proceeds from issuing this liability do not go to target shareholders. Instead, they can be
used by the raider to finance the takeover. Leveraged takeovers may then be profitable even if
there is a free-rider problem à la Grossman-Hart (1980).
The use of leverage does not come without costs. High leverage increases expected bank-
ruptcy costs and mutes the raider’s incentives to create value. Moreover, the target’s incumbent
management can sell firm assets or undergo a leveraged recapitalization to weaken the raider’s
borrowing capacity. These counterforces to leverage imply that the raider typically cannot ap-
propriate the entire surplus, but only a fraction. The actual division of surplus between the
raider an target shareholders depends, among other things, on the institutional environment,
such as, e.g., takeover legislation and bankruptcy procedures.
Historically, LBOs have played a much bigger role in the United States than in Europe. This
is partly due to the more restrictive European (anti-)takeover legislation.44 For instance, the
Second European Directive on Company Law (1976) prohibits target companies from using their
assets to provide security for the acquirer’s debt.45 Recent developments suggest a possible volte-
face: In January 2003, the Italian government passed a new legislative decree allowing bidders to
use the target company’s assets as security for their debt (Italian Civil Code, Section 2501-bis).
Consistent with our story, observers argue that the new law will “help to boost activity” and
44See Berglöf and Burkart (2003) for an overview.
45The wording is: “A company may not advance funds, nor make loans, nor provide security, with a view to
the acquisition of its shares by a third party” (Article 23, Second European Directive on Company Law).
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“make good buyouts cheaper, easier, and safer.”46
An interesting, and to our knowledge still open, question is why the legal environment for
LBOs is so much more restrictive in Europe. One possible explanation relates to diﬀerences
in labor market rigidity. An active market for LBOs–and takeovers in general–involves the
reallocation of capital (including human capital) across firms, and possibly the restructuring of
entire industries, as the U.S. experience from the 1980s would suggest (Jensen (1993)). The cost
of such reallocation is greater the more rigid the labor market. In countries with rigid labor mar-
kets, lawmakers may thus be reluctant to introduce a more active market for corporate control,
for fear of the consequences this might have on employment. If this is true, a successful reform
of the takeover market will have to go hand in hand with a labor market reform. The political
economy link between financial and labor markets has recently been stressed by Pagano and
Volpin (2001), who examine the tradeoﬀ between investor protection and employment protec-
tion. With respect to takeover legislation, a similar tradeoﬀ might help understand why there
are diﬀerences between Europe and the United States.
9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof proceeds in two steps. We first derive the raider’s optimal
debt level D∗. We then show that the raider’s profit given the optimal debt level is decreasing
in B. As argued in the main text, the raider never chooses D such that the posttakeover share
value is below the pretakeover share value. As the posttakeover share value, (14), is decreasing
in D, there exists a unique value D, such that the posttakeover share value exceeds or equals
the pretakeover share value if and only if D ≤ D. If D = D, post- and pretakeover share value
are equal, which implies D is given byZ V
B+D
³
V −B −D
´
g (V )dV =
Z V
B
(V −B)h (V )dV. (23)
By the above argument, we can consider a relaxed problem where the raider maximizes (17)
subject to D ≤ D. Diﬀerentiating (17) with respect to D gives 1−G (B +D)−kDg (B +D) . At
D = 0 the derivative is strictly positive, implying that there are two solution candidates:D∗ = D
and D∗ ∈ (0,D), where the latter is given by the first-order condition
1−G (B +D∗)− kD∗g (B +D∗) = 0. (24)
46Solani, A., “Italy: LBOs come of age,” European Venture Capital Journal, December 1, 2002.
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We can now compute the eﬀect of B on the raider’s profit. The total derivative of (17) with
respect to B at D = D∗ is
dΠ
dB
¯¯¯¯
D=D∗
=
∂Π
∂B
¯¯¯¯
D=D∗
+
∂Π
∂D
¯¯¯¯
D=D∗
∂D∗
∂B
, (25)
where
∂Π
∂B
= −kD∗g(B +D∗)−
Z V
B+D∗
g(V )dV < 0.
Consider first the case where D∗ = D. For D to be a solution, it must be true that
∂Π
∂D
¯¯¯¯
D=D
= 1−G(B +D)− kDg(B +D) ≥ 0.
Moreover, diﬀerentiating (23) we get
∂D
∂B
=
G(B +D)−H (B)
1−G(B +D) < 0,
where the sign follows from FOSD.
Consider next the case where the optimal debt level is given by (24). By the envelope
theorem, we have that dΠ/dB = ∂Π/∂B < 0. Q.E.D.
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